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Abstract
This paper analyses, within a static model, the effect of quality concern
on optimal market structure. It focuses on cases where industry quality
has public-good like features and is not contractible. It is shown that the
introduction of competition raises a free-rider problem which depresses
quality (the smaller producer free-rides on its competitor investment
which as a result underinvests). To encourage the efficient producer to
provide quality, the regulator diminishes the market-share of the oppor-
tunistic producer and chooses more often a monopoly. However when
quality is verifiable the introduction of competition entails no welfare
loss whether the regulator observes total quality outcome or individual
contributions.
JEL classification: D43, D44, D82, L15, L43.
1 Introduction
The quality of service in public utility industries has many dimensions.
For example, the quality of electricity, gas, or telecommunication supply
is defined not only by the physical specifications of the commodity (e.g.,
the voltage of electricity or the heating value of gas), but also by the
reliability and frequency of the service, the safety of the technologies,
and the expanse of client services (the clarity of the bills, the time of
intervention in case of emergency, and so on). Some of these components
are verifiable but many are not. In particular it may be very costly, if
not impossible, to prove in court that electricity or telecommunication
networks are built or run in an inefficient way, that the current pur-
veyors of the industry underestimate the gain which would arise from
the construction of new transmission facilities, or that the probability
of a core meltdown at a nuclear plant fails to meet the social optimum.
Since it is hard to include quality in a formal contract, regulatory agen-
cies have devoted more attention to quantity and price control than
to the promulgation of unenforceable standards. The responsibility for
maintaining the quality of the service remains to a large extent with the
supplying companies.1
There is an extensive literature on the provision of quality by unregu-
lated firms (for a nice survey, see Tirole (1988) chapter 2). Although this
seems to be an important issue to explore in a regulated environment,
it has been largely overlooked in the past.2 The aim of this paper is
to study how the introduction of competition (i.e, a duopoly structure)
in a traditionally regulated monopoly affects the provision of quality
when some aspects of the transaction are not contractible and when
quality has public-good like features. It contributes to a new literature
1When quality is verifiable it can be included in a contract exactly like a quan-
tity (for the regulation of a multiproduct firm see, for example, Sappington (1983),
Laffont-Tirole (1990)).
2To our knowledge, there are very few works on this topic. Lewis-Sappington
(1991) compares the optimal regulation of a monopoly when the quality is verifiable
with that when it is not. Laffont-Tirole (1993) focus on the link between quality
provision and power of incentive schemes.
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on endogenous market structure in contracting environment which as-
sess the impact of asymmetric cost information on optimal regulatory
policy and auction design. Along this line Anton-Yao (1989,1992), An-
ton (1994) examine split-award auctions in procurement with respect to
quantity, Auriol-Laffont (1993), Auriol (1996-a, 1996-b) optimal auction
with variable quantity under various cost structures, Dana-Spier (1994)
study mechanism design with the discrete award choices of a duopoly,
a monopoly or government self production, Wolinsky (1994), Anton-
Gertler (1994) and McGuire-Riordan (1995) focus on models of spatial
duopoly. The main result of this literature is that asymmetric infor-
mation favors the monopoly structure –sole sourcing– when the market
structure decision –the award of market shares– follows cost revelation
by firms (ex post framework). The intuition for this result is the follow-
ing. Under asymmetric information firms get informational rent that
increases the final cost of acquisition. To lower this extra cost it is op-
timal to distort the market structure decision in favor of the monopoly
because under this new contract term a firm that claims high-cost faces
reduced probability of producing. This perspective lowers firms’ incen-
tive for inflating cost report. It is to note that this pro monopoly bias
can be reversed in an ex ante framework. When the market structure
decision precedes the contracting stage Auriol-Laffont (1993), Auriol
(1993) and Riordan (1994) hence shown that asymmetric information
often favors duopolistic structure.3
In this paper we study the impact of partial deregulation on the pro-
vision of quality. Since the reform waves of the seventies and eighties in-
troduced competition in public utilities, transportation and communica-
tion industries, it seems important to analyze the impact of these trans-
formations on sectors once asserted to be natural monopolies. The re-
forms anticipated the fact that intensified rivalry would result in greater
3This is in particular the case when the price elasticity of the demand is low.
When the principal has established a single producer at the pre-contracting phase,
the monopoly power of this firm is ex post (i.e. at the time of contracting) very high
if quantity is not flexible. To prevent ex post extortion by the monopoly it is optimal
to choose more often a duopoly.
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efficiency, reduced cost and price, and increased quality and product
variety. But we wonder whether, depending on the industry character-
istics, some of this goals are not inherently conflicting. In particular in
industries involving fixed connections between suppliers and customers
(e.g., gas, water, train, telephone, or electricity) the competition has to
take place through a single network because it is inefficient to duplicate
transmission facilities. The interconnection –which is a preliminary to
competition– yields economies of scale but it also complicates operations.
It ties the different producers into a system where each individual action
has a repercussion on every other member of the net. This physical unity
is what differentiates interconnected systems from other systems of dis-
tribution of goods and services. We refer to this “link-together” property
as the interconnected system effect. It is at play in most network indus-
tries, in particular in the natural gas industry, where customers get the
average quality of the gas in the pipelines at the time of their purchase,
in the telephone industry, where congestion phenomenon and incidents
affect blindly all users, and in the electric industry: “All components
of an electric power system are physically connected, and all can be dra-
matically affected by events elsewhere in the system. [...] The failure of
a single AC-DC converter in a Florida Power and Light Co. nuclear
plant in December 1982, for instance, triggered loss of power to 556,000
customers from the Georgia border to the Florida Keys. [...] A mod-
ern power system is in fact one large machine.” Joskow-Schmalensee
(1985).
This paper is an attempt to take the complexity and the multidi-
mensionality of public utilities services into account.4 In particular it
studies how the introduction of competition affects quality –reliability–
provision when quality has public-good like features. It is shown to
depress it. When the market is split between two firms, the larger sup-
plier is the only one that provides quality while its smaller competitor
free-rides on the investment through the network. Since the producer
4They can be decomposed into the supply of a commodity, a level of reliability
and a range of customers services options.
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that pays for the reliability of the system cannot fully internalize the
gains of doing so, it underinvests. To cushion this problem, the market-
sharing rule has to be distorted in favor of the larger supplier. This
distortion adds to the incomplete information distortion in such a way
that the monopoly structure is chosen more often. That is, reliability
concern militates for monopolistic structure. It reduces the diversity of
the service options available to consumers, but also raises quality. How-
ever when the aggregate outcome in quality is verifiable, the regulator
is able to take advantage of the competition without giving up quality:
she unbundles the quality provision activity from the production. In
this case the introduction of competition entails no welfare loss. This
result is true whether the regulator observes the total quality outcome
or individual suppliers’ contributions.5
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
the main assumptions. Section 3 characterizes the complete information
solution. Section 4 presents the situation where the regulator has imper-
fect information about the firms’ marginal cost. Section 5 summarizes
our results and offers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a regulation problem in which a commodity can be supplied
through a common network by two firms, firm a and firm b. Let qi(≥ 0)
denote the quantity produces by firm i(= a, b), and vi(≥ 0) its quality
contribution. The consumers’ gross surplus function, which is common
knowledge, is:
Sˆ(qa, va, qb, vb) = S(qa+qb, va+vb) + qaqb.
This function captures the basic features described in the introduc-
5This is consistent with Picard-Rey (1990) and McAfee-McMillan (1991) result
on team models with both moral hazard and adverse selection (these authors shown
that it makes no difference whether the principal observes the outcome of the team
or individual contributions).
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tion. To see how it can be generated consider the following simple hori-
zontal differentiation model. A continuum of consumers uniformly dis-
tributed over the unit interval have an inelastic demand for one unit
of the good (the market size is normalized to q = 1). They derive the
same gross utility s(v) for consuming one unit of the good at a quality
v (uniform due to interconnection), but then incur a “transportation”
cost δ, that can be interpreted as a location in the space of good charac-
teristics, proportional to their “distance” to the supplier. Their utility
is: s(v) − δ. The suppliers are exogenously located, when active, at
the extreme points. With a single producer, lets say in 0, the con-
sumers gross surplus is: S(q, v) =
∫ q
0 s(v) − δdδ = s(v) − q
2
2 . With a
duopoly (one firm in 0 the other in 1) with market share qa for firm a
and qb for firm b (qa + qb = q), the aggregate gross surplus becomes:
S(qa, qb, v) =
∫ qa
0 s(v)− δdδ +
∫ qb
0 s(v)− δdδ = S(q, v) + qaqb.
The interpretation of this function is the following. Due to the in-
terconnection, the individual contributions mix and become indistin-
guishable to consumers (as it is the case in telecommunication, gas or
electricity industry when several producers operate on the same net-
work): the surplus depends upon the total output available in the econ-
omy, q = qa + qb, and upon the firms’ aggregated quality contributions,
v = va + vb.6 However along with the commodity goes a bundle of
services which differentiate horizontally the producers (such as contract
options, technical assistance, qualification of the staff, convenience of
the offices, and so on). The consumers, who have varied tastes and
needs, value the diversity. Their gross surplus function increases with
the duopoly since it provides the greater variety of service. This diver-
sity effect is captured by qaqb ≥ 0. It implies that the consumers gross
surplus is maximum for qa = qb. With a monopoly the menu of services
shrinks, there is a loss in welfare. The surplus becomes S(qi, vi).
We denote by H(q, v) = Sq(q, v) ≥ 0 the partial derivative of S(q, v)
6We consider the sum but we could equivalently consider the mean (or any increas-
ing function of aggregated quality satisfying the gross surplus concavity requirement).
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with respect to q. The inverse demand function for “good” i can be
written:
P i(qa, qb, v) = H(q, v) + qj i = a, b, j 6= i,.
When the market structure is a monopoly with firm i the inverse
demand function becomes P (qi, vi) = H(qi, vi).7 We assume that the
consumers’ gross surplus function and the inverse demand function for
the good i(= a, b) are increasing in v and concave in (qa, qb, v). A suffi-
cient condition for this to happen is
A1 S(q, v) + q
2
2 is increasing and strictly concave in (q, v);
H(q, v) is increasing in v and strictly concave in (q, v).
Moreover, we assume that the net surplus function S(q, v) + qaqb −
P a(qa, qb, v)qa − P b(qa, qb, v)qb, is increasing with the quality. That is8
A2 Sv(q, v)−Hv(q, v)q ≥ 0.
This assumption implies that an improvement in quality increases the
gross surplus of consumers more than it increases the gross profit of sales.
The social gain of an improvement in quality exceeds the willingness to
pay for it.
The producers face a two-part cost function:9
Ci(βi, qi, vi) = βiqi + vi i = a, b,
where βi (∈ [β, β]) is the efficiency parameter identifying the firm (a
high βi corresponds to a high cost, i.e., an inefficient producer), qi ≥ 0
the quantity it produces and vi ≥ 0 its quality contribution. The cost
function is linear with respect to quantity qi. It features constant mar-
ginal cost as in Baron-Myerson (1982). On the other hand the quality
7We drop the index of the firm in P (., .) because when the market structure is a
monopoly the aggregated consumers surplus does not depend on which firm serves
the market but on how much it produces.
8The subscripts denote the partial derivative with respect to v.
9To simplify matters, we assume that there is no fixed cost to enter the market
but this assumption is not essential.
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investment does not depend upon quantity (it is not variable). It can be
interpreted as the amount of money dedicated to increase the capacity
of the system above the level required to operate in normal conditions.
The higher it is the smaller the probability of an incident. For instance
in electricity the reliability of the system is a matter “of absorbing the
dynamic power swings and remaining stable following a disturbance re-
sulting in the loss of any single generating unit, transmission circuit
or transformer” Spiewak-Weiss (1991). A reliable, stable, high-quality
service is achieved through global overbuilding. It implies that it is
difficult to distinguish between investments those designed to improve
quality from those made for commercial purposes. The fixed costs can-
not usually be attributed solely to one account. The quality investment
is not verifiable.
We assume that the regulator is not able to observe the cost of the
firms. The βi which are a private information of firms’ manager, are
assumed to be independently drawn from the same distribution. We
denote by F (βi) the cumulative distribution function and by f(βi) the
density function of βi ∈ [β, β]. The functions F (.) and f(.) are common
knowledge. They satisfy the monotone hazard rate property (to avoid
bunching):
A3 F (β)/f(β) is non decreasing.
Moreover we assume that all the agents are risk-neutral. The reg-
ulator maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function (the sum of net
consumers surplus and firms profit), under the firms’ individual ratio-
nality constraint taking into account that the social cost of public funds
is 1 + λ > 1 (λ is strictly positive because of the need to use distortive
taxation to raise money). The firms reservation profit is normalized to
zero.
Finally, the timing of the model and the instruments of each player
are the following: the regulator proposes an auction mechanism with
a set of contracts that specify in function of firms cost announcement
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market shares, transfer payments, and quality requirement when it is
verifiable. The firms make their bid. The regulator sets the market
structure (monopoly or duopoly), the quantities and the quality outcome
(whenever it is verifiable) as defined by contracts. When quality is not
verifiable, the firm or firms choose (simultaneously and independently)
their contributions in quality. Depending on the quantities and on the
aggregate quality outcome, consumers express an (inverse) demand for
the services, P i(qa, qb, v).10 We assume that the regulator is not able to
monitor this (inverse) demand (it is not verifiable).11 We must stress
that the unverifiability of the (inverse) demand function is linked to the
unverifiability of the quality. When quality is verifiable, the regulator
monitors indirectly price while regulating quantity and quality (quantity
while regulating price and quality).
3 The case of complete information
Let W and W iM denote the ex post utilitarian social welfare functions
when the market structure is respectively a duopoly and a monopoly
with firm i = a, b (U i and U iM are the corresponding firm i’s profit):
W = S(q, v)+qaqb+λP aqa+λP bqb−(1+λ)(βaqa+βbqb+v)−λUa−λU b
(1)
W iM = S(q
i
M , v
i
M)+λP (q
i
M , v
i
M)q
i
M−(1+λ)(βiqiM+viM )−λU iM .
(2)
The regulator maximizes under firms’ individual rationality con-
straint the following problem with respect to market structure (monopoly
10Since under our assumptions, the demand functions admit for each level of quality
an inverse demand function, it is a question of convenience that the regulator sets
quantities rather than prices, and that consumers express inverse demand rather than
demand.
11An alternative assumption would be that the demand is subject to some exoge-
nous random shocks such that it is impossible to deduce from prices observation the
quality level. Even if the firms are assumed to be risk-neutral, the regulator cannot
exploit their neutrality (i.e., base the contract on ex-post sales) because they are
protected by limited liability (which take the form of ex post rationality constraint).
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or duopoly), quantities, quality and producers’ profit (or equivalently
producers’ transfer payment):
Max xDW + xaW aM + x
bW bM
s.t. U i = ti + P i(qa, qb, v)qi − βiqi − vi ≥ 0 (IR)
U iM = t
i
M + P (q
i
M , v
i
M )q
i
M − βiqiM − viM ≥ 0 (IR)
Term xD ≥ 0 and xi ≥ 0 are the probabilities of choosing respectively
a duopoly structure or a monopoly structure with firm i(= a, b). We
assume that it is worth producing even with high cost firms. That is,
xD+xa+xb = 1 ∀βa, βb ∈ [β, β].Moreover, since the objective function
is linear in xD, xa, and xb, these probabilities are at the optimum either
equal to 0 or 1. We maximize independently W , W aM , and W
b
M with
respect to rent, quantities and quality. The optimal market structure is
the one associated with the maximum of these three functions. To ensure
that the functions W and W iM are concave we make the assumption
A4:12
A4 1 ≤ Hv(q, v)−Hqv(q, v)q ≤ 2.
We derive the optimal solution. Under complete information (βa, βb
known), the rents which are costly (λ>0), are set to zero in each regimes:
U i∗ = 0 and U iM = 0 (i = a, b). Moreover let q
∗ be solution of:
H(q∗, v∗)− βa+βb2 = −λ1+λHq(q∗, v∗)q∗ − 1+2λ2(1+λ)q∗. (3)
If q∗ > 1+λ1+2λ | βb − βa |, the optimal market structure is a duopoly
with market share:qa∗(q∗, βa, βb) = 12q∗ + 1+λ1+2λ
βb−βa
2
qb∗(q∗, βa, βb) = 12q
∗ + 1+λ1+2λ
βa−βb
2 .
(4)
It is a monopoly with the more efficient producer, identified bymin(βa, βb),
12The subscript q (resp. v) denotes the partial derivative with respect to q (resp.
to v).
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otherwise. The monopoly production level is solution of:
H(qM∗, vM∗)−min(βa, βb) = −λ1+λHq(qM∗, vM∗)qM∗. (5)
The quality formula is the same in monopoly and duopoly regime. For
an aggregated production level q, it is solution of:
Sv(q, v) + λHv(q, v)q = 1 + λ. (6)
The optimal level of quality, which is characterized by the equality
of the social marginal cost of providing it 1 + λ with its social marginal
benefit Sv+λHvqh, is independent of the market structure. Indeed as the
costs are linear and separable in (β, q) and v, the social marginal cost of
providing quality is the same whatever the market structure. Moreover,
as the individual contributions in quality sum up in the surplus function,
the social benefit of quality does not depend upon which firm provides
it. It depends however on the total output (vM∗ = v(qM∗), v∗ = v(q∗)).
In the duopoly case, because of the imperfect substitutability of the
commodities, even with different incremental costs both firms produce.
To maximize the consumer surplus, which increases with the diversity
in service options, the production should be equally divided between
the two producers. But for cost minimization, the more efficient firm
alone should produce. The optimal sharing rule is the result of a trade-
off between these efficiency and diversity concerns. The more efficient
producer receives a greater part of the market than its competitor (from
equations (4) we have 1+λ1+2λ
βi−βj
2 > 0 when β
i > βj). The gap between
the production levels increases with the difference in the firms’ cost
parameters.
When the difference between the costs of the firms becomes large
the duopoly structure is no longer attractive. The regulator chooses a
monopoly held by the more efficient producer (the firm with the higher
cost has a zero probability of being chosen as monopoly: xiM (β
a, βb) = 0
if βi = max(βa, βb)). Dividing equation (5) byHq(qM∗, vM∗)qM∗, we see
that the monopoly pricing formula follows the Ramsey rule (the lerner
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index is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity time λ1+λ). Moreover
it is to note that the production level of the firm in a monopoly position
is independent of its competitor cost.
Comparing the monopoly and the duopoly welfare at their first best
levels, we characterize the optimal market structure decision. It depends
upon the relative forces of the efficiency and diversity concerns (the proof
is in appendix). Let
∆∗(β) = 1+2λ1+λ q
M∗(β). (7)
Proposition 1 If the difference between the cost parameters |βb− βa|,
is greater than ∆∗(min(βa, βb)), the monopoly structure is optimal under
complete information; otherwise the duopoly structure is preferred.
Accordingly the duopoly structure becomes less attractive when one
of the firms is much more efficient than the other (|βb−βa | is large) or
when the market is small (it is easy to check that d∆
∗
dqM∗ ≥ 0).
4 The cases of asymmetric information
We now consider the situation in which firms have private information
about their cost characteristic. By using the revelation principle we
restrict the analysis to direct revelation mechanisms. The regulator
extracts the producers’ private information through incentive compatible
mechanisms. We focus on truthful (subgame perfect) Bayesian Nash
equilibria.
4.1 Individual quality contributions are verifiable
In this section, which describes a benchmark case, we assume that the
quality provided by each firm is verifiable and can be contracted upon.
The principal faces a pure adverse selection problem; she adds firms’
incentive compatibility constraints to the program.
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Let U i(βi) = Eβj U i(βi, βj/βi) denote the firm’s expected util-
ity when telling the truth. From the envelope theorem, first and sec-
ond order incentive compatibility constraints are: (IC1) U˙ i(βi) = −
Eβj
[
xD(βi, βj)qi(βi, βj) + xi(βi, βj)qiM (β
i, βj)
]
;
(IC2) ∂
∂βi Eβj
[
xD(βi, βj)qi(βi, βj) + xi(βi, βj)qiM (β
i, βj)
]
≤ 0 (∀βi ∈
[β, β], i = a, b, j 6= i). As the expected rents are socially costly (λ>0)
and decreasing in βi (from (IC1) we have U˙ i(βi) ≤ 0), the individual
rationality constraints (to be satisfied ex post due to limited liability)
U iM (β
i, βj) ≥ 0 and U i(βi, βj) ≥ 0 ∀βi ∈ [β, β] are binding at βi = β.
That is (IR): U iM (β, β
j) = 0, U i(β, βj) = 0. Integrating (IC1) with re-
spect to (IR) yields: Eβi U i(βi) =
∫ β
β
∫ β
β
[
xDqi+xiqiM
]
F (βi)
f(βi)
dF (βj)dF (βi).
Substituting this expression into W equation (1) and W iM equation (2),
the principal solves with respect to market structure, quantity and qual-
ity:
Max
∫ β
β
∫ β
β
{
xDW + xaW aM + x
bW bM
}
dF (βa)dF (βb) (8)
s.t. (IC2).
As under complete information, the regulator’s maximization prob-
lem is linear in xD and xi (i = a, b). She maximizes independently
W and W iM with respect to quantity and quality. The optimal market
structure is the one associated with the maximum of the three functions.
Appendix 2 shows that (IC2) constraints are met by the following solu-
tion.
Let qa∗, qb∗ be defined equation (4), and let q be solution of:
H(q, v)− βa+βb2 = −λ1+λHq(q, v)q − 1+2λ2(1+λ)q + λ2(λ+1) [F (β
b)
f(βb)
+F (β
a)
f(βa) ]. (9)
If q > 1+λ1+2λ | βb − βa | + λ1+2λ | F (β
b)
f(βb)
− F (βa)f(βa) |, the optimal market
structure is a duopoly with market shares:q
a(q, βa, βb) = qa∗(q, βa, βb) + 12
λ
1+2λ [
F (βb)
f(βb)
− F (βa)f(βa) ]
qb(q, βa, βb) = qb∗(q, βa, βb) + 12
λ
1+2λ [
F (βa)
f(βa) − F (β
b)
f(βb)
].
(10)
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It is a monopoly associated with min(βa, βb) otherwise. The monopoly
production level is solution of:
H(qM , vM )−min(βa, βb) = −λλ+1Hq(qM,vM )qM+ λ1+λ F (min(β
a,βb))
f(min(βa,βb))
. (11)
The optimal quality formula is the same as under complete infor-
mation. For the appropriated agregated levels of production it satisfies
equation (6).
Protected by the incomplete information efficient firm can always
pretend to be inefficient –an impossible claim to verify– and be reim-
bursed accordingly. It then secures for each unit produced the difference
between its claim and its true cost: the informational rent. The rent
is a function of the production levels required from high-cost produc-
ers, but it does not depend on the quality outcome. Rent extraction
and provision of quality are hence disconnected. This result is due to
the separability in v and (β, q) in the cost function. Likewise under
complete information the optimal quality level depends upon the total
quantity produced and not upon the particular market structure. How-
ever the quality outcome is lower under asymmetric information since
the quantities are distorted for rent extraction.
In the duopoly case the regulator uses simultaneously the market-
share allocation and the total duopoly output to reduce the informa-
tional cost. She modifies the sharing rule in favor of the more effi-
cient producer (term F (β
j)
f(βj)
− F (βi)
f(βi)
in equation (10) which is positive
when βi ≥ βj). This policy discourages the firms from overstating
their cost since under the new contract term they receive shrunk mar-
ket share when inflating their report. As the informational cost in-
creases with the aggregate duopoly output, the regulator distorts (low-
ers) also the total production to reduce the firms’ informational rent
(term λ1+λ
1
2 [
F (βb)
f(βb)
+F (β
a)
f(βa) ] in equation (9), which implies that q
∗(βa, βb) ≥
q(βa, βb) ∀βa, βb∈ [β, β]2).
When the difference between the firms’ cost is large, the duopoly
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structure is no longer attractive. Likewise under complete information
the market structure is a monopoly held by the more efficient supplier.
The production level which is independent of its competitor cost, is
also distorted to reduce the cost of the monopoly informational rent.
However, this distortion is lower than in the duopoly case since the
average informational cost is smaller (F (min(β
a,βb))
f(min(βa,βb))
≤ 12 [F (β
a)
f(βa) +
F (βb)
f(βb)
]).
Let us now compare the monopoly and duopoly welfare under in-
complete information. The following proposition is shown by similar
arguments as proposition 1. Let
∆(β) + λ1+λ [
F (β+∆(β))
f(β+∆(β)) − F (β)f(β) ] = 1+2λ1+λ qM (β). (12)
Proposition 2 If the difference between the cost parameter | βb − βa |
is greater than ∆(min(βa, βb)), the monopoly structure is optimal under
incomplete information; otherwise the duopoly structure is preferred.
From assumption A3 it is easy to check that ∆(β), solution of equa-
tion (12), is positive. Moreover, we see from equations (7) and (12) that
for a given quantity, the monopoly structure occurs more often under
incomplete information than under complete information. This result
generalizes. Comparing the first best solution to the incomplete infor-
mation solution it is straightforward under assumptions A1 and A4 to
show the following result.
Proposition 3 Asymmetric information distorts the optimal market
structure towards monopoly. That is, ∆(β) ≤ ∆∗(β) ∀β ∈ [β, β].
Asymmetric information increases production costs by charges pro-
portional to the hazard rate. In order to lower these informational rents,
the regulator distorts the market sharing rule in favor of the more ef-
ficient firm. This policy reduces the gain for an efficient producer of
mimicking an inefficient one. The regulator distorts also the market
structure decision in favor of the monopoly because by doing so she low-
ers the incentive for inflating cost report (a high-cost firm has a decreased
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probability of producing under incomplete information). Moreover, as
the global production is reduced to lower the cost of rent extraction, all
the distortions combine to lessen the benefit of a duopolistic structure.
In other words, asymmetric information favors the monopoly structure
when quality is verifiable which is consistent with the results on en-
dogenous market structure under asymmetric information quoted in the
introduction.
4.2 Quality is unverifiable
In this section we assume that the quality of the delivered product can be
perfectly observed by the consumers and the supplier but is not verifiable
to any third party. Moreover, since the inverse demand is not verifiable,
the principal faces reduced opportunities for regulating the firms. She
can choose the market structure, monitor transfers and quantities but
not quality. She faces at the same time a problem of moral hazard and
adverse selection.
4-2-1 First we focus on the subgame in quality. At a previous stage
of the game the firms made their bids; according to these announcements
market structure, production levels and transfers are set. Depending on
the contract reached, the firm or firms then freely choose their outcome
in quality. The quality outcome, vm(qmi ), chosen by firm i when it is in
a monopoly position is solution of:13
Hv(qmi , v
m)qmi − 1 = 0 i = a, b. (13)
Comparing this solution to the benchmark case where quality is ver-
ifiable (equations (6) and (13)), we get (the proof is in appendix):
Lemma 1 Other things being equal, the level of quality provided by the
13We assume that the monopoly problem in quality admits an interior solution.
Under assumption A1, quantity and quality are gross complement (which here is
equivalent to net complement), that is Sqv(q, v) > 0. If they were gross/net substitute,
Sqv(q, v) = Hv(q, v) would be negative and the quality level provided by the monopoly
would be at its minimum.
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monopoly is lower than its social optimum.
As we pointed out in Section 2, under assumption A2 an improve-
ment in quality raises the gross consumer surplus more than it increases
the gross profit of sales. As the monopoly is not able to capture the
whole social gain generated by the quality outcome, it tends to under-
provide quality. It does not internalize the non-monetary benefit of its
investment.
If the market structure decided at stage 1 is a duopoly with allocated
production (qad , q
b
d), the quality level provided by the firms does not
coincide with that in the monopoly case. It satisfies proposition 4 (the
proof is in appendix).
Proposition 4 When the market structure is a duopoly, there is only
one firm that provides quality. It is the firm with the larger market
share. The aggregate duopoly outcome, denoted vd(qad , q
b
d), satisfies for
qd = qad + q
b
d:
Hv(qd, vd)max(qad , q
b
d)− 1 = 0. (14)
Due to the interconnected system effect, the quality in the duopoly
case depends upon the agregated contributions of the suppliers. Since
they are not distinguishable to consumers, the provision of quality con-
stitutes a team activity for the producers. The problem is that, as
quantity and quality are complementary in their profit function, they
disagree about what should be the collective outcome. The producer
with the larger market share wants a higher level of quality than its
smaller counterpart. This disagreement between the “team” members
creates the free-rider problem. The smaller supplier cares less about
quality than its opponent. It free-rides on the latter through the net-
work, providing the authorized quantity at a minimum quality level.
Contrary to the verifiable case, the rule establishing quality as a
function of quantities depends upon the market structure. Indeed, com-
paring equations (13) and (14) it is straightforward to show that for
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the same aggregate output (i.e., qad + q
b
d = q
m), the monopoly and the
duopoly do not yield the same quality level.
Proposition 5 The introduction of competition deteriorates the quality;
for the same aggregate quantity, the quality outcome is always lower with
a duopoly structure than with a monopoly.
The introduction of competition tends to degrade quality (reliabil-
ity). The smaller producer which cares less about it, skimps on invest-
ment. It takes free advantage of each unit invested by its competitor and
does not lose customers, while the latter is inadequately rewarded for the
costs it incurs. This opportunist behavior discourages the larger sup-
plier from investing properly. Therefore for the same aggregate output,
the duopoly structure offers a less reliable service.
4-2-2 The regulator, having computed the quality level that she
might expect as a function of the market structure and the quantities
has to optimize on these variables. Since the cost functions are separable
in v and (β, q), the quality level chosen by the firms at the second stage
of the game depends only upon quantities, and not upon the cost para-
meters βa, βb (see equations (13) and (14)). For this reason the incentive
constraints, (IC1) and (IC2), remain unchanged from Section 4-1. The
regulator maximizes with respect to market structure and quantity:
Max
∫ β
β
∫ β
β
{
xDW + xaW aM + x
bW bM
}
dF (βa)dF (βb)
(15)
s.t. vm(qmi ) solution of (13) i = a, b
vd(qad , q
b
d) solution of (14)
(IC2).
Before solving this problem, we establish the following preliminary
result (the proof is in appendix).14
14Lemma 2 may seem obvious but it is not. In particular one can show that if the
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Lemma 2 The firm with the lower marginal cost always receives the
larger part of the market.
It follows immediately from lemma 2 and proposition 5 that the
more efficient firm alone provides quality since it always gets the larger
market-share. This result enables us to solve the regulator maximization
program (16). It is linear in xD, xa, and xb; we maximize independently
W and W iM . In order to ensure the concavity of the problem, we make
assumption A5:
A5 Hv(q, v)q and Hv(q, v) are concave in (q, v).
Appendix 6 shows that under our assumptions the program (15) is
concave and that (IC2) constraints are met by the following solution.
Let qa, qb be defined equation (10), and qd be solution of:
H(qd, vd)− βa+βb2 = −λλ+1Hq(qd, vd)qd − 1+2λ2(1+λ)qd + λ2(λ+1)
[
F (βb)
f(βb)
+F (β
a)
f(βa)
]
(16)
−v
d
qa
+vd
qb
2
Sv(qd,vd)+λHv(qd,vd)qd−(1+λ)
1+λ
If qd ≥ 1+λ1+2λ | βa − βb | + λ1+2λ | F (β
a)
f(βa)−F (β
b)
f(βb)
| + Hv[Sv+λHvqd−(1+λ)]−Hvvmax(qa,qb)(1+2λ) ,
the optimal market structure is a duopoly with market shares:q
a
d = q
a(qd, βa, βb) +
vd
qa
−vd
qb
2
Sv+λHvqd−(1+λ)
1+2λ
qbd = q
b(qd, βa, βb) +
vd
qb
−vd
qa
2Θ
Sv+λHvqd−(1+λ)
1+2λ
(17)
It is the monopoly solution qm associated with min(βa, βb) otherwise.
The monopoly production level is solution of:
H(qm,vm)−min(βa, βb) = −λλ+1Hq(qm,vm)qm + λλ+1 F (min(β
a,βb))
f(min(βa,βb))
(18)
−vmqm Sv+λHvq
m−(1+λ)
1+λ
∣∣∣
(qm,vm)
.
producers’ costs are correlated or asymmetric (drawn independently from different
distributions), even in a Baron-Myerson (1982) type of model, the less efficient firm
may be selected to produce; for more on this see Demski-Sappington-Spiller (1987),
Auriol (1993), Auriol (1996-a).
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The quality level provided by the monopoly satisfies equation (13)
and the quality provided by the duopoly equation (14).
As we pointed out in lemma 1, the monopoly tends to underpro-
vide quality because it does not take into account the non monetary
benefit generated by its investment. The duopoly structure yields even
less quality because the free-rider problem adds to this internalization
problem.
In order to correct these distortions the regulator modifies the con-
tracts. As she cannot directly control the quality, she has to use the
production allocation rule to simultaneously extract the informational
rents and enhance quality provision. In the duopoly case, she distorts
the market-sharing rule in favor of the more efficient producer (term
(vdqi−vdqj )Sv+λHvq
d−(1+λ)
2Θ(1+2λ) in equations (17) which is positive for β
i < βj).
This new distortion adds to the incomplete information distortion ana-
lyzed section 4-1. They both favor the more efficient firm which gets the
larger part of the total production. By doing so the regulator simulta-
neously diminishes the gain of mimicking inefficient firm (producers face
shrunk market-share when inflating cost report) and increases the inter-
est in quality provision (quantity and quality are complement in profit
function). The regulator distorts also the global production rule (she
tends to expand total duopoly output) because by raising the quantity
produced by each firm, in particular the quantity produced by the more
efficient one, she raises also the quality. Everything else being equal,
the aggregate duopoly output is larger when quality is not verifiable
when that it is (term (vdqi+v
d
qj )
Sv+λHvqd−(1+λ)
2(1+2λ) in equation (16), which
is positive under assumptions A2 and A4).
When the difference between the cost parameters is large the duopoly
is no longer attractive. The optimal market structure is a monopoly
held by the more efficient producer. In this case the free-rider problem
disappears but the underprovision problem subsists. The regulator has
to distort the production rule to solve it. She has a single instrument
to achieve the conflicting goals of rent extraction and quality provision.
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To lower the cost of asymmetric information, the production must be
decreased (term λλ+1
F (min(βa,βb))
f(min(βa,βb))
≥ 0 in equation (18)), but to raise
quality it must be increased (term −dvmqm [Sv(qm, vm)+λHv(qm, vm)qm−
(1 + λ)] ≤ 0 under A3, A4). The optimal monopoly production level
depends upon the relative force of these two effects. It may be either
smaller or bigger than in the verifiable quality case.
Let us now compare monopoly and duopoly welfare under incomplete
information. Once noted that for a given agregated output, the duopoly
quality outcome converges to the monopoly one when min(qad , q
b
d) con-
verge to 0, proposition 6 is shown by similar arguments as proposition
1. Let
∆d + λ1+λ
[
F (β+∆d)
f(β+∆d)
− F (β)f(β)
]
= 1+2λ1+λ q
m(β)− Hv [Sv+λHvqm−(1+λ)]−(1+λ)Hvvqm
∣∣∣
(qm,vm)
.
(19)
Proposition 6 If the difference between the cost parameters, | βa−βb |,
is greater than ∆d(min(βa, βb)), the monopoly structure is optimal under
incomplete information; otherwise the duopoly structure is preferred.
Everything else being equal, the critical difference between the cost
parameters is bigger when the quality is verifiable when that it is not
(because of the term Hv [Sv+λHvq
m−(1+λ)]
−Hvvqm =
Hv [Sv−Hvqm]
−Hvvqm ≥ 0 under as-
sumptions A1, A2). This result generalizes. Indeed comparing the un-
verifiable quality case to the verifiable one, we get the following propo-
sition (the proof is in appendix).
Proposition 7 Under our assumptions, the non verifiability of the qual-
ity distorts the optimal market structure towards monopoly. That is,
∆d(β) ≤ ∆(β) ≤ ∆∗(β),∀β ∈ [β, β].
When the market is split between two firms, the larger supplier is
the only one to contribute to the system reliability while its competitor
free-rides on the investment. Discouraged by this behavior, the former
underinvests. The regulator reacts to this problem by diminishing the
20
market share of the opportunistic producer. This distortion combines
with the asymmetrical information distortion. They both increase the
gap between the two suppliers production which lowers the interest of
duopolistic structure.15 As a result the regulator chooses more often a
monopoly. This policy reduces the diversity in service options but, as
a single firm bears all the consequences of its investment, it solves the
free-rider problem and thus raises quality. Quality –reliability– concern
favors the monopoly structure when it is not verifiable.
4.3 The aggregate quality outcome is verifiable
In this section we assume that the aggregate outcome in quality is ver-
ifiable, but that the individual contributions are not. Since the prices
depend only upon aggregate quality outcome and individual production
levels, as she regulates quantity outputs and total quality the principal
indirectly controls the prices. She has more instruments to regulate the
firms. In fact she is able to set contracts such that quality, quantity, and
transfers coincide with the solution of the verifiable quality case. The
following proposition is demonstrated in appendix.
Proposition 8 There is no welfare loss whether the regulator monitors
the aggregate quality outcome or the individual contributions.
When the aggregate quality outcome is verifiable, the regulator is
able to solve the free-rider problem posed by the coexistence of several
suppliers without dissipating the benefits of competition. She replicates
the incentives of a regulated monopoly by dissociating the provision of
quality from production. For this purpose she sets one of the firms li-
able for the reliability of the whole system. This firm is rewarded in
accordance with the cost of providing the required quality outcome. Its
competitor, which is not involved in the quality provision, is allowed to
15The social benefit of enlarging service options is linked with the quantities each
suppliers is authorized to sell; it is maximal when the producers’ market share
equalize.
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free-ride on the investment. By unbundling the regulated service, the
principal is able to promote competition in the segment of the market
which is likely to benefit from it while she maintains regulation on the
part with natural monopoly characteristics. This dissociation process
has been used to introduce competition in sectors like the natural gas
industry (unbundling gas production from gas transportation) and the
telephone industry (unbundling long distance services from local ser-
vices). The argument advanced for dividing up the service is that it im-
proves market performance by enhancing competition in several parts of
it. However the economic efficiency of unbundling relies on how much, if
any, economy of scale ensues when the unbundled activities are produced
jointly. Here these economies are nonexistent because the cost functions
are separable in the quality provision and in the production. It is likely
to be as in the gas example where transportation and production are
two distinct activities.
Figure 1 contrasts the optimal market structures under incomplete
information when quality is and is not verifiable in the firms’ cost space;
[Figure 1]
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the introduction of (duopolistic) competition in
industries where quality –reliability– has public-good like feature. Veri-
fiability is a key element of the regulatory process. Indeed, when quality
is unverifiable the introduction of competition raises a free-rider prob-
lem that cannot be solved. The problem arises because the firms form
different quality ends when confronted to different market shares (quan-
tity and quality are complement in their profit function). Yet, due to
the interconnection, the provision of quality constitutes a team activity
for them. As a result the smaller producer which cares less about qual-
ity free-rides on its opponent’s investment. This opportunistic behavior
discourages the efficient supplier from investing properly. The regulator
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responds to this problem by increasing the market share of the efficient
firm and by choosing more often a monopoly. However when quality is
verifiable (either at individual or aggregate level) the regulator is able
to take advantage of competition without giving up quality. She dis-
sociates (unbundles) the quality provision activity from the production
activity. Since reliability, regularity, and safety are essential concerns
in public utility industries, these results suggest that with verifiability
problems, competition is more likely to yield net benefits under com-
mon carrier structures than under vertically integrated structures with
obligated access.
From this point of view, the reform of the US electric power system
does not correctly addresses the reliability issue. The Energy Policy Act
(EPAct) enacted in October 1992, gives the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission expanded powers to mandate transmission access and re-
inforces the legitimacy of non-utility generators. These non-utility gen-
erators “have proved to be aggressive competitors; in recent years, they
have accounted for more than half of new generation capacity brought on
line in the United States” Watkiss-Smith (1993). Since their weight in
the US power market is steadily increasing, their responsibility to the
system operating reliability must be seriously addressed. Yet the EPAct,
which preserves the current vertically integrated structure of the indus-
try, deals only superficially with this issue. In light of our results we
are afraid that the reform provokes in the future stability and reliability
concerns.
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APPENDIX 1 : proof of proposition 1
Note that the monopoly problem is a particular case of the duopoly
one: W iM (q
i, v) = W (qi, 0, v). Under assumption A1 W being strictly
concave in (qa, qb, v), we deduce that the duopoly is the optimal market
structure iff min(qa∗, qb∗) > 0; From equation (4) this is equivalent
to | βa − βb |< 1+2λ1+λ q∗(βa, βb). Let ∆∗(β) = 1+2λ1+λ q∗(β, β + ∆∗) and
substitute it into (3) yields: q∗(β, β + ∆∗) = qM∗(β); we deduce easily
the result.♦
APPENDIX 2 : (IC2) constraints
Define ψ(β) = ∆(β)+β, where ∆(β) is solution of equation (12).
Differentiating ψ(β) we get dψ(β)dβ ≡ (1+2λ)Hq+λHqqq+(1+2λ)(1+2λ)Hq+λHqqq >0, under A1,
A3. As ψ(β) is strictly increasing in β ∈ [β, β], ψ−1(β), the inverse
function of ψ(β), exists and is also increasing in β ∈ [ψ(β), ψ(β)]. We
define Ψ(.) and Ψ−1(.) the prolongation of ψ(.) and ψ−1(.) to IR:
Ψ(β) =

β if β ≤ ψ−1(β)
ψ(β) if β ∈ [ψ−1(β), ψ−1(β)]
β if β ≥ ψ−1(β)
Ψ−1(β) =

β if β ≤ ψ(β)
ψ−1(β) if β ∈ [ψ(β), ψ(β)].
β if β ≥ ψ(β)
Proposition 2 implies: xi(βa, βb) = 1 ⇔ βj ≥ Ψ(βi), xd(βa, βb) = 1 ⇔
Ψ−1(βi) ≤ βj ≤ Ψ(βi). We deduce:
Eβj [xiqM + xDqi] = [1− F (Ψ(βi))]qM (βi) +
∫Ψ(βi)
Ψ−1(βi)q
i(βa, βb)dF (βj).
It is next easy to check the following conditions:
(i) qi(βi,Ψ−1(βi)) = 0 if βi ∈ [ψ(β), ψ(β)] and Ψ˙−1(βi) = 0 otherwise,
(ii) qi(βi,Ψ(βi)) = qiM (β
i) if βi ∈ [ψ−1(β), ψ−1(β)] and Ψ˙(βi) = 0
otherwise.
Differentiating (IC1) and simplifying with conditions (i) and (ii), yields:
∂E
βj
(xDqi+xiqM )
∂βi
= [1−F (Ψ(βi))]dqM (βi)
dβi
+
∫Ψ(βi)
Ψ−1(βi)
∂qi(βa,βb)
∂βi
dF (βj). Suf-
ficient conditions for (IC2) are: dq
M
dβ ≤ 0 and ∂q
i(βa,βb)
∂βi
≤ 0. Under
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A1, A4, A3, dq
M
dβ =
[1+λ+λ d
dβ
F (β)
f(β)
][Svv+λHvvq]
[(1+2λ)Hq+λHqqq][Svv+λHvvq]−[(1+λ)Hv+λHvqq]2 ≤ 0, and
from equation (10) ∂q
i(βa,βb)
∂βi
≤ 0 as soon as q defined equation (9) is de-
creasing in βi. That is under A1, A3, A4:
∂q
∂βi
=
1
2
[1+λ+λ d
dβi
F (βi)
f(βi)
][Svv+λHvvqD]
[(1+2λ)Hq+λHqqq+
1+2λ
2
][Svv+λHvvq]−[(1+λ)Hv+λHvqq]2 ≤ 0.♦
APPENDIX 3 : proof of lemma 1
Let Φ(v) = 11+λ
[
Sv(q, v) + λHv(q, v)q
]
and Π(v) = Hv(q, v)q. For a
given q the optimal quality level is solution of: Φ(v) = 1; the level chosen
by the monopoly is solution of: Π(v) = 1. Since under assumption
A1 Φ(v) and Π(v) are decreasing in v and since under assumption A2
Φ(v) ≥ Π(v) ∀v ≥ 0, we deduce easily the result.♦
APPENDIX 4 : proof of proposition 4
Firm i solves with respect to vi: Max [ti(β˜i, β˜j)+ P i(qad , q
b
d, v
d)qid(β˜
i, β˜j)−
vi − βiqid(β˜i, β˜j)]. We focus on Nash equilibria. The first order con-
ditions are such that: U ivi = Hv(q
d, vd)qid − 1 = 0 (i = a, b). Ex-
cept when the quantities qad and q
b
d are equal, there is no interior so-
lution to this duopoly quality problem. Let vi+ be the level of ag-
gregate quality which maximizes the firm i profit (vi+ is such that
Hv(qd, v)qid(β˜
a, β˜b) = 1), the firm i best reponse function to firm j
is: V i(vj) = vi+ − vj if vj ≤ vi+ and V i(vj) = 0 otherwise. Note
next that under assumptions A1 and A4, dv
i+
dqi
d
= Hvqq
i
d+Hv
−Hvvqid
≥ 0; that is,
qid > q
j
d ⇔ vi+ > vj+. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium for this
game. It is given by: qid > q
j
d ⇒ vid = vi+, vjd = 0.♦
APPENDIX 5 : proof of lemma 2
Assume that βb > βa, and that at the optimum qbd > q
a
d . Consider
next the following transformation: qa+ = qad + (q
b
d − qad) and qb+ =
qbd−(qbd−qad), which preserves unchanged the total output (qad+qbd = qa++
qb+) and the quality provided by the duopoly (vd(qa+, qb+) = vd(qad , q
b
d)).
Comparing the value of the program at (qad , q
b
d) and (q
a+, qb+), we get:
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W+ = W + (qbd − qad)[(1 + λ)(βb − βa) + λ(F (β
b)
f(βb)
− F (βa)f(βa) )] > W under
assumption A3; a contradiction.♦
APPENDIX 6 : Optimality of the Solutions
Concavity of the regulator’s program: Note that WM (q, vm(q)) =
W (q, 0, vd(q, 0)). WM (q, vm(q)) is concave in q if W (qa, qb, vd(qa, qb)) is
concave in (qa, qb) which is true if (a) Wqiqi ≤ 0 and (b) WqaqaWqbqb −[
Wqaqb
]2 ≥ 0. it is easy to check although tedious, that condition (a)
is satisfied under assumptions A1, A4, A5, and that condition (b) is
satisfied under assumptions A1, A2, A4, A5.
(IC2) constraints: (same proof as in appendix 2 but with ψ(β) re-
placed by ψd(β) = ∆d(β) + β which is a strictly decreasing function
under assumptions A1, A3, A5). Sufficient conditions are dq
m(β)
dβ =
1+λ+λ d
dβ
F (β)
f(β)
WMqq
≤ 0, and ∂qid
∂βi
=
[1+λ+λ d
dβi
F (βi)
f(βi)
]W
qjqj
WqaqaWqbqb−[Wqaqb ]2
≤ 0 (i = a, b j 6= i),
which are true under assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, A5.♦
APPENDIX 7 : Proof of Proposition 7
Note that under A3 x+ λ1+λ
[
F (β+x)
f(β+x) − F (β)f(β)
]
is strictly increasing in x.
A necessary and sufficient condition for proposition 7 is then: qm(β) −
qM (β) ≤ Hv [Sv+λHvqm−(1+λ)]−(1+2λ)Hvvqm . Let g(q) = vmq
Sv(q,vm)+λHv(q,vm)q−(1+λ)
1+2λ ,
since vmq ≥ Hv(q,v
m)
−Hvv(q,vm)q a sufficient condition is q
m(β)−qM (β) ≤ g(qm(β)).
Define Φ(q) =
(1+λ)[H(q,vm)−β]+λHq(q,vm)q−λF (β)f(β)
1+2λ , and let Q
M (β) be solu-
tion of Φ(QM (β)) = 0. From lemma 1, v(q) defined equation (6), is such
that v(q) ≥ vm(q) ∀q ≥ 0, and from A1, A4 dqMdv = (1+λ)Hv+λHqvq−[(1+2λ)Hq+λHqqq] ≥
0. We deduce that qM (β) ≥ QM (β) ∀β ∈ [β, β]. It is thus sufficient
that: qm(β) − QM (β) ≤ g(qm(β)). Since from equation (18) qm(β)
is such as: Φ(qm(β)) + g(qm(β)) = 0, we rewrite this condition as
qm(β)−QM (β) ≤ Φ(QM (β))−Φ(qm(β)) which is true as soon as Φ˙(q) ≤
−1 ∀q ≥ 0. This is equivalent to [Hqvq + Hv][(1 + λ)Hv + λHvqq] ≤
Hvvq[(1+2λ)Hq+λHqqq+1+2λ].We deduce the result under assump-
tions A1, A2, A4.♦
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APPENDIX 8 : Proof of Proposition 8
One of the two producers is set liable (l) for the aggregate quality
outcome. It is reimbursed for the cost incurred if quality coincides with
equation (6). Otherwise, it suffers an infinite penalty. At stage 2 of
the game, the best reponse function of the firm liable for the quality is
V l(vnl) = v(qa+ qb)− vnl if vnl ≤ v(qa+ qb), and V l(vnl) = 0 otherwise,
where v(qa + qb), is the solution of equation (6). The best reponse
function of its opponent (nl) is V nl(vl) = vd(qa, qb)−vl if vl ≤ vd(qa, qb),
and V nl(vl) = 0 otherwise. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium for
this game. It is given by: vl = v(qa + qb), vnl = 0.♦
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